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Ls的, 我找不到我原来看过的关于李祥林的报告了。Google了一下,有个文章,内容差不多:
1 z) @7 I3 p( F2 g! ?6 b! X! ehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_X._Li
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9 J% _& L& X: H3 M7 C/ Y. F3 YDavid X. Li is a quantitative analyst and a qualified actuary who pioneered the use of Gaussian copula models for the pricing of collateralized debt obligations.[1][2]# o# p" v$ a2 A5 R+ L! d
0 |) F7 \2 {0 o9 TLi grew up in rural China in the 1960s.[1] He received a master's degree in economics from Nankai University before leaving China to get an MBA from Laval University in Quebec.[1] He then got two more degrees, a master's in actuarial science and a PhD in statistics, both from the University of Waterloo in Ontario.[1] His financial career began in 1997 at Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.[1] In 2004 he moved to Barclays Capital where he worked on rebuilding its quantitative analytics team.[1]- E' r& {# x; y- U7 |1 ^: Z
5 ]" T4 X% U+ `In 2000, while working at JPMorgan Chase, Li published a paper in The Journal of Fixed Income titled "On Default Correlation: A Copula Function Approach."[2] This was the first appearance of the Gaussian copula which quickly became a tool for financial institutions to correlate associations between multiple securities.[1] This allowed for CDOs to be accurately priced for a wide range of investments that were previously too complex to price, such as mortgages. However in the aftermath of the Global financial crisis of 2008–2009 the model has been seen as fundamentally flawed and a "recipe for disaster".[1] According to Nassim Nicholas Taleb, "People got very excited about the Gaussian copula because of its mathematical elegance, but the thing never worked. Co-association between securities is not measurable using correlation," because past history can never prepare you for that one day when everything goes south. "Anything that relies on correlation is charlatanism."[1] Li himself always understood the limitation of his model, in 2005 saying "Very few people understand the essence of the model."[3] Kai Gilkes of the credit research firm CreditSights says "Li can't be blamed", although he invented the model, it was the bankers who misinterpreted it.[1]! U+ u& C2 ~, m4 X
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In 2008 Li moved to Bejing where he works for China International Capital Corporation as head of the risk-management department.[1]: H8 n( t6 [' d3 C) O# H1 _
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信用卡危机,我不敢胡乱解析,我也是看过文章后,胡说八道罢了。不过有兴趣大家讨论一下。
- W8 E! j- N, b/ \我的理解,信用卡危机的严重性在于:
6 c ]0 O( ?% ^, D. L: j1, 如Ls所说, 传统意义上的Default的风险已经被出售。 经济危机的直接结果使得产生坏账的可能性和期望价值超出临界值,使得上游产品比如CDO的价值下降。就像LS 说的,这是个连锁反应。对于这些,经历过两房危机的Fed应该有明确的数据了,不该起大浪。
2 c, R% g/ N! N( J( E! L7 K V2, 我的理解,也在什么地方看过的:% Z# p. ~* F: h3 S6 y4 n8 }
1) 信用卡的坏账的快速增长,非但严重挤压金融机构的信贷规模,而且坏账的增加,影响了金融机构的等级评估,直接造成信贷成本增加和必须大量预提准备金。资本负债贷方的增加,很可能造成更多金融机构的破产。特别是,不像两房债券,那些主要集中在Inversting Bank 手中,信用卡的坏账集中在商业银行中,一旦出现破产,挤兑的风险更大。美国有7000 多家的商业银行,目前,好像只有少数破产。
. d$ ]! l1 R. u$ h5 i9 z4 L9 x2) 信用卡危机的出现,释放三个信号,1, 居民收入降低,2,居民可支配收入减少 3,居民的对隔代间的期望降低,三个因素降低了居民的消费支出,这对于要应付Recession的Fed来说,是最不愿意看到的。最新的失业数据和生产企业景气指数和中央银行资金平衡表表明,美国人的消费支出持续降低。7 V2 z; A" m4 U+ v
3) 信贷业务量和信贷能力的降低,使得生产企业难以获取资金,危机真正出现,接下去,破产,失业。。。。# k2 P2 a' I( E- {4 L9 t
2,Bernake 的一万亿计划,一是用量的方法,捍卫零利率。 虽然Fed Fund的利率已经为零到零点25, 但货币隔夜市场的利率和远期利率交易,远远高于这个水准, 尽管目前的通胀率只有0,4,实际利率仍然没有到零或是个低位。二是释放一个信号,市场需要这么多钱,至少才能活。3,不知道这招是鼓舞了人心,还是当头一棒?却不说量够不够,或是从哪里,如何去收购债券,多是有抄作上的难度。要知道,目前的4500亿只有700亿流入了实体经济。计划还没实施,已经唉声一片。9 S* H8 B. J L7 ~6 w1 S
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以上胡说八道,水了ZDP的贴,还请见谅。。。。
: I: |! \! b0 ^5 h! m建议大家开个新贴,国之大事胡说八道贴,大家交换意见。 |
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